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COMPUTER SYSTEMS AS INSTITUTIONS: SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS OF COMPUTING IN ORGANIZATIONS
Suzanne Iacono aud Rob Kling

University of California, Irvine

ABSTRACT
This paper introduces terminology and develops a framework for incorporating and emphasizing
important social and political choices that become part of the history of Computer-Based Information
Systems (CBIS) and are embedded in the social structure which supports its development and use.
These social and political elements of a CBIS are not just discrete elements in an environment. They
can be organized in specific ways which may enhance usability and performance and, paradoxically,
constrain implementations and post-implementations.
It is argued argue that CBIS, developed from complex, interdependent social and technical choices are
better conceptualized as institutions than as tools. The distinction between tools and institutions is
important for several reasons: the usability of CBIS is the critical factor, not the technology itself;
CBIS that are well-used and have stable social structures are more difficult to replace than those with
less social structure and fewer participants; and CBIS vary from one social sctting to another according
to the ways in which they are organized and embedded in organized social systems.

1.

INTRODUCTION

intended by their designers (Markus 1983). While imple-

mentation research has found no single cause for success

Many information systems analysts and organizational

or failure, MIS analysts usually point to discrete organiza-

tional or technical elements as critical factors: inadequate management, lack of management support, user
resistance, or complex systems (Laudon and Laudon

theorists focus on the capabilities of computer-based information systems (CBIS) when analyzing their benefits
and limitations. CBIS are characterized as tools for attaining work group or organizational outcomes such as

1988).

productivity-enhancement, increased efficiency, worker
control or strategic advantage.

Some researchers have recognized that control over many

aspects of implementation processes is much more diffiDiscourse which foregrounds the instrumental value of
CBIS is rich and varied. Some analysts narrowly define
CBIS as tools to support specific information processing

cult to maintain than was previously assumed. One strategy for managing difficult implementations is the identification of risk factors and probablistic assessments of
success. Another strategy is to broaden the meaning of

tasks. Other analysts focus on social and political impacts
of CBIS implementation and use. Political analysts view

implementation to include "the entire process of organiza-

CBIS as tools which bring power payoffs such as en-

tional change surrounding the introduction of a new information system" (Laudon and Laudon 1988, p. 625). A
broader definition can contribute to increased recognition
of the importance of user participation in implementation

hanced decision-making abilities or changes in the distribution of power and influence among different types of
staff. Marxists argue that managers use CBIS to increase
their control over work processes and decrease worker
control (Braverman 1974). While each of these accounts
varies in the degree to which social relations are relevant
factors, they all assume that specific organizational in-

processes.

In this paper, we argue that the analytic spotlight should
be moved away from discrete clements of computerization processes to the patterns which structure the environment and are part of an organized social system.
Many of the elements of the social system are non-cognitive and taken for granted. Over time, they become
deeply embedded in the social fabric and resistant to

terest groups will be able to control the deployment of
the technologies in their physical work setting and attain
the outcomes they intend (Galbraith 1977; Poppel 1985;
Simon 1977).

However, we know from empirical studies of actual out-

change.

comes of implementing CBIS into organizations that anti-

cipated benefits do not materialize easily. In extreme
cases, a CBIS fails to meet the preferences of many or
most users and falls into disuse (Brewer 1973; Dery
1981). In other cases, CBIS are not used as they were

For example, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy may
never be able to effectively share a common command
and control system regardless of the technologies involved
or the adequacy of management since they are committed
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to very different battle strategies and strongly prefer their
own equipment (Kling 1987). The traditional differences
between these two armed service units will probably con-

social and technical intervention (Johansen and Baker
1984; Mumford 1982; Pava 1983). Much of the literature

on socio-technical design is concerned with identifying a
participatory social process whereby those who will use a

strain any substantial use of a common system.
2.

new technology have some influence over the design process. The choices implemented through the design process, or the environment which embodies them, are not
usually predetermined by the technology. For example,

EXPLANATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
FAILURE

some organizations have adopted word processors and
simultaneously centralized their machine operators into
word processing centers. There is no feature of word

Public policy literature points to one kind of organized
social system which acts as a constraining mechanism in

processing machines that requires that a center be set up;

bureaucratic organizations: standard operatingprocedures
(SOP). SOPs act as obstacles to change because they are
deeply embedded in an organization and difficult to con-

the equipment can easily be decentralized and often is.
Regardless of which choices are made, end-users must
deal with the social dimensions of the computing environment as well as with the particular computer-based tech-

trol (Edwards 1980). Public policy analysts argue that
when a new policy requires change in an organization's
SOPs, there is less likelihood that it will be implemented

notogies.

as its designers intended. One example is the Social Se-

curity Administration (SSA), which was accustomed to
evaluating individual claims and saw itself as a payment

While we fundamentally agree with the socio-technical
approach, we differ in several important ways.

program. When Medicare became law, the SSA acquired
new responsibilities for health care containment. Since

1) We emphasize continuous user participation in the

post-implementation phase of CBIS use, not just

they had little interest or expertise in the planning and
budgeting of health care, they focused on claims denials
in response to unnecessary or uncovered health care.
Even after criticism from the Senate Finance Committee
and the adoption of a more active role in cost containment, they still limited their activities to those which fit

during the original implementation (Kling and Iacono
1984b).

2) We emphasize a broader spectrum of participants by
including the influence of resource controllers and
decision-makers.

their SOPs.

In MIS, the study of political dimensions in systems implementations incorporates some elements of organized
social systems (Keen 1981). The focus is on power shifts
and the redistribution of power and influence in organizations (Danziger et al. 1982; Markus 1983). These anal-

3) We focus less on design choices that may be implemented in software and more on the social and technical choices implemented in computerized work environments (Kling and Iacono forthcoming).

yses, however, are based on several questionable assump-

4)

tions:

•

that the distribution of power is always a zero-sum
game--some participants always end up losers while
others end up winners;

•

Our approach is less normative than analytical, although we can provide some direction for future design and development.

We argue that CBIS developed from complex, interdependent social and technical choices are better conceptualized from a social-structural perspective than from a
rational-technical or rational-political perspective (Pfeffer
1982). From a social-structural point of view, CBIS can
be characterized as institutions with organized social systems rather than as discrete entities that can be easily

that the outcomes of power differentials among
lateral work groups or lateral classes of participants
will be similar to the outcomes of power differentials
between managers and workers;

controlled. Resistance to implementations does not have

•

outcomes into group political action, such as resis-

to result from conscious political actions, but it can be the
product of the inertia of structure. In fact, this view recognizes that most organizational actors are in the dark
about decision-making and what actions they could actually take to effect change. A social-structural view of
resistance can include political actions taken by some organizational actors but it does not require awareness a

tance.

priori of what the outcomes may be.

that individual participants can know a priori what
the outcomes of a future system implementation and

its use will mean for them not just individually but as
a group; and
•

these participants can turn individual cognition of the

The socio-technical design approach emphasizes yet
another comprehensive organized social system. Its

We will characterize perceptions of CBIS as tools and as

guiding insight is that computerization is simultaneously a

simplest to define an institution as social arrangements

institutions in some detail below.
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At this point, it is

which persist and are taken for granted, even when they

do not work well and some powerful group members
want to make changes. Perceptions of CBIS as tools, on
the other hand, contain visions of flexible social arrange-

ments which can be easily changed or replaced by most

We characterize the social organization of computing in a

particular setting as arising out of three major determinants:
1.

any group member. While there is no unified body of

Political

analysis which advocates understanding CBIS solely from
an instrumental perspective, these characterizations pervade much of the literature to some degree.

•

Who controls new developments of the CBIS and
controls the purchase and deployment of associated computing equipment (Danziger et al.
1982; Kling and Iacono 1984b; Markus 1983).

3.

•

Any systematic criteria which characterize pat-

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF COMPUTING

terns of control and access to computing resources such as status, participation in particular

In this paper, we introduce some terminology and deve-

lop a framework for incorporating and emphasizing important social and political choices that become part of
the history of a CBIS and are embedded in the social
structure which support its development and use. These
social and political elements of a CBIS are not separate
discrete elements in the environment. Rather they can be

coalitions, access to special revenues, etc.

•
2.

organized in specific ways which may enhance usability
and performance and, paradoxically, constrain implemen-

Social

•

tations and post-implementations.

The deployment of the organization's stack resources.

The actual distribution of equipment and data
across work groups, physical locations, and time
(Kling and Iacono forthcoming).

We do not know all of the social factors that comprise a
highly usable and stable CBIS environment. We have
conducted a case study which illustrates the difficulties

•

one organization's members faced when confronted with
an important CBIS conversion project. Even when participants took major steps to correct discrete problems,
they could not effectively complete the conversion during
a two-year period. Since no single set of elements could
effectively explain the failure, we examined the particular
way in which the elements were organized.

•

Patterns of control and discipline in working with
the CBIS and associated computing equipment
(Kling and Iacono 1984a; Lawler and Rhode
1976).
Organizational practices about training users,

computer staff and support staff (Kling and
Iacono forthcoming).
•

We conceptualize these patterns as the social organization
of computing. We define "social organization of com-

3.

puting" as the choices about computing (both social and
technical) which become embedded in work environments
and which are experienced by the users as part of the

social practices in their everyday work world. For
example, a word processing technician who works in a
word processing center will have very different work experiences than a secretary using the very same word pro-

Skills of computing staff, users, and support staff.

Historical
•

the sequence of its past social and technical configurations and the sequence of its potential future configurations (Kling and Iacono 1984b).

•

the commitments made in the past which may
limit the range of future configurations.

cessing equipment in an end-user department.

The configurations that develop in any given work setting

How people experience computing will vary from one
computerized work setting to another according to several
major variables: implementation strategy, management
style, type of computing equipment, major uses of computing, occupations of the users, history of computing in
the work group, extensiveness of computing equipment

are not purely instrumental or motivated by efficiency
concerns. Each configuration has social and political
meanings for CBIS users. Status differences between
professionals and clerks may be reflected in the quality of

and use, and the adequacy of resources and infrastructure
to support the environment. Combinations of these vari-

the work stations in their offices. Practices that give
managers newer or larger capacity work stations in private offices while clerical workers share older machines in
open bull-pens are rooted more in traditional social pra-

ables will produce both intended and unintended consequences. In addition, the computing practices of the

ctices than conscious efforts to increase productivity or
efficiency in the office.

work group may seem irrational to outsiders who have no
awareness of the social world within which those particular people work.

Before we present our case, we will contrast characterizations of the social organization of computing as tools and
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institutions. The comparison will highlight some of the
ways in which social and political elements can be or-

capabilities of the technology as it may be used by

individuals.

ganized. This paper does not test the framework; rather

2.

it identifies a framework and interprets it through the
case study. This paper raises many questions which merit
future investigation.

CBIS that are well-used and have stable social structures for supporting and using them (those that re-

semble institutions) will be much more difficult to
change or replace than those with less social structure and fewer participants (CBIS that resemble
tools).

4.

TOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS

3.
Organizational theorists use the concepts tool and institution to characterize types of organizations and their social
roles. We use the concepts to analyze major differences

in characterizations of the social organization of computing in organizations.

SOCIAL:

Selznick (1957) distinguished between an efficiencyguided administration of rational means-oriented organi-

POLITICAL:

zations and the value-laden responsive process of institu-

tionalization. For Selznick, institutions strive for permanence, while means-oriented organizations serve a particular purpose and people can dispense with them once
the purpose is fulfilled.

Local and Simple
Negotiating Context

Complex and Overlapping

Local Control

Shared Control

and
Self Interest

Interest Groups

Negotiating Contexts

and

Figure 1. Three Determinants of the Social

Organization of Computing

When analysts emphasize the information-processing
capabilities of a computer-based technology, they are
foregrounding its "toolness" or instrumental value for particular social units, e.g., faster access to information for
individuals, better turn around times for a work group, or
a competitive edge for organizations.
When analysts emphasize the social and political choices
that organizational actors have made over time, they are
foregrounding its institutional character. An institutional
concept incorporates the perspectives of various interest
groups as their choices become embedded in the social

It produces about 40 million

structures around the CBIS. Long after some interest
groups have lost power or influence in the organization,
their interests and visions may still be embedded in the
way things are done. Some of the important elements in
understanding the differences between tool and institutional organizations of computing are described below.

checks per month and was developed in the 1950s in
Autocoder. It remained relatively intact through the early
198)s. The SSA has tried to overhaul the payments system at least three times in the last fifteen years without
success, although a new Systems Modernization Plan that

Even

though some new laws were passed during the late 1970s
(e.g, eligibility requirements) which changed the way in

4.1 Social Determinants

which payments are legally distributed, none of these laws
had actually been implemented in software for at least

The image of a CBIS as a tool is associated with tremendous personal freedom. The assumption is that individuals are free to use a CBIS as they prefer without con-

five years:

The distinction between tools and institutions is important
for several reasons (sce Figure 1):
1.

INSITrUTION

Future

The SSA payments system provides an illustration of in-

may be completed in the 1990s is in progress.

TOOL

HISTORICAL: Freedom of the Present Commitments of the Past
Gives Hope for the
Constrain the Future

Top managers and other participants often have trouble
rapidly improving CBIS which are troublesome. From a
tool view, such difficulties would be surprising since "skill
and will" should be sufficient. Larger scale CBIS have
important institutional dimensions which limit the abilities
of key actors to transform some of the abstract information processing capabilities of CBIS into concrete systems
which serve their interests. The development of specialized computing arrangements facilitates routine behaviors but constrains novel behaviors. This specialization
and routinization stabilizes social arrangements, but also
impedes organizational actors who seek large-scale
changes.

stitutional inflexibility.

CBIS vary from one social setting to another, even
when they are identical "off the shelf' systems.

straints from other sources. The social context of use
appears at first glance relatively simple with few agencies
requiring compliance to their demands or negotiation

The actual useability of technologies in specific social
settings is the critical factor in assessing social bene-

with peers. In actual practice, such simple work settings
are relatively rare. Issues of social order, power, and

fits (its institutional character), not the potential
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social control emerge where more than one person is interested in the resource and its potential benefits.

time as they routinely fulfill the computing preferences of
particular groups over the preferences of other groups.
They are likely to hire new staff who primarily share their

world views in preferring particular application domains
(e.g., finance), languages (e.g., COBOL), equipment vendors (e.g, IBM), etc. However, specialization and routini-

Institutional analyses emphasize the social use of CBIS
and social control over the computing arrangements.
When work groups share an information processing resource, such as a CBIS, the resource managers are likely
to have negotiated particular arrangements with different
groups at different times. These arrangements cross-constrain shared resources. Over time, large changes become potentially more costly and difficult, since commitments in the past may limit the range of future configura-

zation will reduce the ability of DP to engage in non-routine work activities at a later time. Consequently, an en-

gineering department which seeks computing support for
computational programs written in Pascal which runs un-

der Unix on a DEC-Vax will usually find systemic difficulties in obtaining meaningful service from a DP shop
which develops financial applications on large mainframes
under VM in COBOL. (The reverse is also likely: the

tions.

Moreover, different user groups often share some interdependent work schedules and routines. The interdepen-

finance staff would have difficulty in obtaining high quality data processing service from an engineering oriented

computing staff who prefer different kinds of applications,
programming languages, and machines.)

dence of work routines implies that the contribution of
some component, policy or practice hinges on its dependency upon other components, policies and work-group
practices. For example, when a fast machine replaces a
much slower machine, one expects speedier handling of
information. However, increased demand on the new
machine may result in some groups of users waiting in
line for access (Schwartz 1975). Their lost waiting time
may exceed the gains of speedier computing. Thus, im-

The inflexibility of organized computing arrangements
impedes those who desire large-scale changes. When
routines become outmoded and no longer useful to the
organization, many users may push for large-scale
changes in the computing arrangements. The organizational routines which facilitated efficient activities and

provements in some components of an ensemble of com-

stable environments in the past may prevent the changes

puting technologies do not necessarily improve overall

which the organization believes are critical to its continuing survival. We call this kind of organized rigidity

performance.

social-stmcmral resistance.

Rather than focusing blame

for failed implementations on end-users who are characterized as either uncooperative or politically astute, the

4.2 Political Determinants

focus is on the choices made in the past and embedded in
the social fabric.

When CBIS are characterized as tools, there is an underlying assumption that computer-based technologies have

no inherent politics: they are consistent with any social
order. The assumption is that CBIS implementations can

4.3 Historical Determinants

support and enable almost any value system or organizational goals. It is rarely acknowledged that conflicts
might ensue from computerization. Typically, it is im-

When CBIS are characterized as tools, attention is focused on a future of technological perfection and peak

plied that conflicts will be reduced. Some analysts explicitly claim that computerized organizations will be less
authoritarian and more cooperative than their less automated counterparts (Simon 1977). In most of the accounts of office automation, staff are cheerfully efficient
and conflicts are minor (Giuliano 1982; Strassman 1977).
The theme that computing fosters cooperation and rationality glosses over deep social and value conflicts that
social change due to computerization may precipitate. In

performance. If there are problems of productivity today,
they can be resolved through the continual acquisition of
advanced technologies. It is assumed that problems will
be resolved when the company goes "on-line" or when
everyone has their own work station. Minor attention is
given to strategies for organizing the use of current technologies or to other strategies for social change. A focus
on the future helps deflect attention from problems of the

practice, organizational participants can have major bat-

present, and also offers hope of salvation. Like people
who purchase a new car or stereo with every model

tles about what kind of computing equipment to acquire,
how to organize access to it, and the standards to regulate its use (Kling and Iacono 1984b; Kling and Scacchi
1982).

change, the heroes of this vision invest heavily and endlessly. When there are problems, attention is focused on
new or better technologies, not the limitations of the current context of use.

When CBIS are characterized as institutions, politics play

Institutional analyses focus on the developmental trajec
tories of CBIS. Institutions develop a character based on
the interests they have served in the past, their organizing
ideologies, and the world views which bind their participants together. Incremental changes in computing ar-

an important role.

Powerful groups can attempt to in-

fluence the developments of a CBIS even when they can
not control the outcomes they desire (Kling and Iacono
1984b). DP departments will specialize their work over
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rangements usually improve the fit between the system

vided PRINTCO with telephone support, but little assislance on site. DP had problems hiring more pro-

and its organization, decreasing the probability that
powerful actors could easily replace it. Participants

grammers with the necessary skills to work on the conversion. Many of the original systems lacked documentation

organize their work lives around the belief that activities
which have become routinized will persist. They come to
depend on existing social and technical arrangements for

working and for achieving personal goals.

which further complicated the conversion project. Programmers had patched the MRP system over the years
and some had left the company. Current DP staff feared
making large scale changes because they were unsure
about how some of the modules interacted.

For these

users, and for other important actors in the organization,

a CBIS can become indispensable.
To illustrate the defining characteristics of tool and institutional concepts, we present a case study which examines

MRP users around the firm complained about DP because they had waited a long time for a payoff. The DP
staff's morale was low. They had invested tremendous
effort and resources, but no longer believed they could

computing arrangements in one complex organization.

convert to the new MRP system.

5.

THE CASE OF PRINTCO

The senior vice president of manufacturing saw an im-

pending crisis. He formed a data processing steering
committee to guide and direct the DP manager. The

Summary case data from one manufacturing organization,
PRINTCO, is presented here to illustrate the differences
between tool and institutional concepts of the social organization of computing: Our data from PRINTCO are
based on 44 detailed interviews which were conducted
over an eighteen-month period with 40 respondents in a
variety of roles, departments and levels of authority. All
respondents were either users or resource controllers of
the Material Requirements Planning (MRP) system, the
core module of the manufacturing computing system in
the organization.

steering committee gave the DP manager specific schedules, but he failed to meet them.
The steering committee hired a new DP manager after a
six-month search in which they found few acceptable can-

didates. His technical background was weak, but his
managerial skills were stronger. He promptly ended the

conversion project. Members of the steering committee

had become resigned to sell the hardware and lose their
investment in the software. The new DP manager and

the committee decided to continue working with their
PRINTCO is a medium-sized manufacturing firm (about
800 employees) which designs, makes and markets three
types of medium-speed dot matrix line printers for the

existing IBM System 34, enhancing the MRP system as
best they could and possibly leasing another System 34, if
necessary. DP upgraded the existing disk and added
memory. Additional ports enabled thirteen people to log
on simultaneously. The new DP manager established
short-term and long-term priorities for departmental
work at the steering committee's direction. In addition,
the committee required and approved written user re-

mini computer and small business computer marketplace.
PRINTCO began shipping printers in 1975 and maintained a fairly constant demand of 12,000 to 15,000
printers a year during the late 1970s despite market fluctuations. During the 1980s, the firm has undergone tremendous growth to become a major producer of dot mat-

guests for new programming tasks.

rix line printers.
Unfortunately, the new DP manager did not follow the
direction of the steering committee and tried to mobilize

Key actors built and began operating a simple MRP system in 1977. They wanted better control over their investments in purchased parts so that parts would be there
when needed but not so far in advance that costly inventory would build up. The system did what they originally

support for purchasing a more sophisticated computer (an
IBM System 38). The steering committee saw little progress on the enhancements of the MRP system. After

ten months, the steering committee fired the new DP
manager.

expected, but as the firm grew they began having increased expectations. They began looking for more
sophisticated software to handle additional manufacturing

Because of the long and arduous work invested in hiring
the prior DP manager, the steering committee decided

computing tasks such as capacity planning and planned
orders. An informal committee found a package that
satisfied their preferences. However, it ran on a Data
General minicomputer, a DG S350 Eclipse, rather than
on their IBM System 34.

not to search outside the firm for a third DP manager.
Instead they promoted the manager of engineering services to the role of Operations Director, a new title for
the DP manager. Almost immediately, they decided to
buy an IBM 43313 and found MRP software to satisfy
their preferences. They started a new conversion project.
The preferences of manufacturing staff mobilized the original conversion effort. DP staff avoided requests from
other user departments during this time. Staff in other

The conversion began in 1980. DP staff believed that it

would take one year.

After 18 months, staff had not

completed the conversion. Apparently unsolvable problems plagued the project. The hardware vendors pro-
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departments began searching for other ways to satisfy

Since the implementation of the original MRP system,

their computing needs.

the data processing department had become specialized

in altering reports from existing systems written in RPGII. The DP staff became skilled in producing the routine
MRP reports for manufacturing and occasional reports
for finance. The programmers were demand driven and
spent their time responding to constant requests for
major and minor enhancements. These enhancements
were relatively simple, concrete, predictable, and generated immediate results, compared with converting the
MRP system.

Several departments obtained DEC LSI-11 micro computers from test equipment cast off by other departments.
They upgraded them into usable computing equipment
with the help of their own skilled staff. Because of problems in DP, no one had paid much attention to the proli-

feration of micro computing.

Soon six to ten LSI-lls

were scattered around the firm. One staff member in the

test equipment area became the informal "expert" in
operating, programming and using the micro computers.

The programmers and end-users worked together in very

PRINTCO had hired consultants and new programmers

simple face-to-face negotiating contexts. Programmers
would comply with these requests on a first-come, firstserved basis with no planning or prioritization schemes
other than what the programmer felt s/he could do first.

to help in the conversion to MRP II on the IBM 4331.
DP staff began working on other projects so that other
users would stop complaining. DP had become a larger,
more successful organization.

After the second DP manager was hired and the conver-

6.

sion project ended, the new manager instituted some
prioritization schemes for ordering programming work
based on the decisions of the members of the steering

AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF A
CONVERSION FAILURE

committee. The manager gave work to the programmers
according to their skill and availability, not according to

We have identified several major problems in PRINT-

their informal ties or rapport with end-users.

CO's failure to convert from MRP I to MRP II. These

hoped that these changes would move the DP department

problems are the product of key actors foregrounding the

from a simple operation to one that could handle more
complex work tasks and larger projects.

potential information processing benefits of the new technologies to the extent that they ignored the social struclure of their current computing environment. They were
not simply replacing one MRP system for another, they

It was

Skills of Computing Staff. The MRP II software was
purchased from an outside vendor because none of the

were also attempting to change the organization of social
relations which surrounded computing in their firm. Although their computing environment was small and some-

DP staff had adequate software development skills.

Development skills had been unnecessary in the past
since they had worked only on maintaining their present

what informal, it was usable and stable, i.e., it was highly
organized.

CBIS, the MRP system and some finance systems. They
had never before attempted to hire new staff with specific

software development skills. PRINTCO's managers presumed that their DP staff had all the skills necessary for
most computing tasks or could easily acquire them. They
had not realized that the skills and work routines of the
department had become very specialized and limited.

How can we characterize the social organization of computing at PRINTCO when they first began their conver-

sion? We have selected episodes which illustrate the
political, social and historical determinants of the social
organization of computing.

PRINTCO's programmers had learned to program on the
job in RPG-II. The new MRP II software for the conversion project was technically more sophisticated than the
old MRP I software. The staff had purchased the new
software to satisfy MRP user needs in manufacturing.
The new software would not run on the IBM mini computer that the DP staff understood. Powerful manufacturing managers decided to purchase the hardware on
which the new software would run. However, none of the
programmers had ever used BASIC, the programming
language of the new environment. They attended several
BASIC programming classes but their learning curve was
slow. Key actors tried to hire people who could program
in both BASIC and RPG-Il to expedite the conversion.

6.1 Social Determinants
Work Prioritization Schemes of Support Staff. The first

DP manager had served as a one-man DP shop during
PRINTCO's earliest days. He spent most of his energy

programming even after he added several more staff.
Requests came into DP informally. The ordering of projects and distribution of programming time often depended on informal contacts between programmers and
users. Short- term, routine projects received the most
attention from staff and long-term, non-routine projects
received little attention or effort. The conversion from
MRP I to MRP II was a novel effort which did not fit the
routine established work patterns of this small DP shop.

However, they could not locate and hire new programmers with programming skills in both languages.
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Laissez Faire Attitudes. Key actors at PRINTCO had
developed a laissez faire attitude toward the DP staff and
the resources they might need to develop an adequate

They discovered that there were more problems than progress. The conversion effort was expensive and showed

no results. The laissez faire attitude of the company
toward DP had not proved successful. Key actors who
had originally thought of their new MRP system as a tool
for manufacturing staff attempted to gain control over
many aspects of the computing environment. They formalized their own membership in a steering committee.
Within the framework of the committee, they began to
focus on changes in the social organization of computing
that might enhance and support the conversion.

social organization of computing for the conversion.
Once monies were allocated to equipment purchases,
powerful actors stopped paying attention to the course of

developments. The original DP manager had never been
a powerful organizational actor who could fight for the
resources he might have needed.
Other staff in the organization, especially staff in engineering, had to develop their own computing environments. Many of these staff had the skills to develop an
adequate infrastructure of support for their own work
groups even though they had very little money to spend

Some staff, especially staff in engineering, were not involved in the conversion nor were they brought onto the
steering committee when it was created. They began to
revolt and sought their own microcomputers. These staff

on equipment. Since they were effectively excluded from
discussions about the conversion project, both at the early

viewed their micros as tools which helped them, develop

stages and later when the steering committee was organized, the firm never took advantage of the skills and
expertise that had developed around computing in the
engineering departments.

small scale CBIS independently of the ineffective DP
shop. The "micro-revolution" lasted a year before control
over computing equipment and programming was recentralized under DP.

Specialization. The most powerful organizational actors

During the conversion project, two computing environments were developing independent of each other. Each
required investments of time and money from the organization. Each was left to run its own course with little

were located in manufacturing and finance.

support and few resources.

6.2 Historical Determinants

They at-

tempted to control the direction of DP and were the best
served customers of DP.

7.

DISCUSSION

Programming support and computing operations became
specialized around these services running a small set of
CBIS and making minor enhancements. The existing
MRP was custom tailored to PRINTCO's manufacturing
operations, and the staff wanted to preserve all of its virtues while adding the new capabilities of MRP-Il.

We have argued that the characterizations of CBIS in
organizations can vary from ones that highlight the information processing capabilities to those that focus more
on the organization of the social systems in which CBIS
are embedded. While the former emphasizes rational use
and the ability to direct and control outcomes, most complex organizations have computing arrangements that

Past Commitments. The organization of computing commitments led to problems with the MRP conversion. Any

more closely resemble institutions. As institutions, the
use and control of the CBIS are shared among interest
groups with different preferences, stakes, and historical

implementation of a product bought outside the firm
would have to be custom tailored to match the virtues of
MRP-I. It was effectively impossible to conceptualize an
MRP-II without accounting for existing commitments to
MRP-I and the capabilities of the DP staff.

commitments. The social structure of the institution adds
complexity and inertia to the attainment of expected outcomes.

At PRINTCO, key actors made the decision to purchase
a new MRP system based on its technical capabilities and
potential benefits to users in the manufacturing department. Their computing environment had many organized

6.3 Political Determinants
Before starting the conversion project, key manufacturing

work practices, commitments, specializations and routines

staff members focused on equipment decisions and negotiating the purchase. They based their decisions on the
preferences of users in manufacturing who wanted a sop-

which they did not take into account when they made the

decision.

histicated on-line MRP system. The informal selection
committee invested time and energy into selecting equipment. Once the equipment was purchased, they returned

Routine work specializes the social organization of com-

puting.

Staff at PRINTCO specialized in producing

manufacturing computing reports. They performed these
activities well. A combination of specific skill levels, the

to their own routine work. After a year had gone by,
some managers started asking critical questions about the

organization of their work prioritization schemes, and
commitments to certain users in manufacturing led to

conversion.
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Turner. They helped sharpen our ideas in an earlier vcrsion of this manuscript. For this version, helpful comments from Professor Srinivasan and several anonymous
referees are gratefully acknowledged. This research was

computing arrangements which supported their routine
work but did not support software development. Even if
they had made efforts to attract software developers by
offering higher salaries than they paid their staff programmers, they may have not been able to find or attract
such staff because of the commitments they had made to

supported this research under grant #81-17719 and DCR850-8484

specific combinations of technologies.
Like the SOPs which develop in bureaucratic organizations, highly organized computing environments help staff
stabilize and routinize their work environments. While
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